EN
On May 12, during the fourteenth Arctic Council meeting which took place in a closed online format, Norway officially handed over the chairmanship to Denmark. A month earlier, a Denmark representative had outlined priorities for the next two years, stating that “the work in the Arctic Council is important not only for the Arctic States, but also for the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic, for us here in Greenland and for the Kingdom.”
On the one hand, his words serve as a reminder of the Arctic Council’s mission — to foster a region free of conflict and competition, where collaborative efforts of all parties concerned focus on sustainable development. On the other hand, they went against the backdrop of President Donald Trump’s remarks about potentially annexing Greenland to the United States by force.
“The Greenland issue creates additional tension. The Inuit take it seriously and understand that as a real threat. Currently, Greenland is represented in the U.S. by an ambassador who will also take on the role of chair of the Arctic Council on behalf of Denmark. I know him in person—he is a strong politician and a true patriot of Greenland,” says Pavel Sulyandziga, former vice-president of RAIPON, now a public figure and chairman of the Council of the International Foundation for the Development of Indigenous Peoples of Russia.
Yet the Greenland issue is far from being the top-1 challenge this unique international organization has been facing. For instance, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine occurred midway Russia’s chairmanship of the Council and ended in 2023 amid a suspension of all international programs.
The Arctic Council’s activities have still not been fully restored. With international competition in the Arctic intensifying, the question of the organization’s future remains unresolved.
“Warm Gulf Stream” Instead of “Polar Breath”: From Rivalry to Cooperation in the Arctic
History shows that even during the Cold War era when the Arctic became a militarized zone Western countries and the USSR found ways to cooperate: they arranged the International Geophysical Year in late 1950s, Soviet and Western scientists joining forces for large-scale planetary research; the Polar Bear Conservation Agreement, still in effect today, was signed by the USA, Canada, the USSR, Denmark, and Norway in 1973; the Norwegian-Soviet Fisheries Commission established in 1976 continues to regulate fishing standards up to today, as well.
However, these were exceptions rather than the rule. The meaningful change in the Arctic had to wait until October 1, 1987, when General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev announced his initiatives reshaping the region’s perception on the international arena. Gorbachev urged for a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe, joint development of natural resources, and opening of the Northern Sea Route. His words signaled that the Soviet leadership was ready to view the Arctic not as a battlefield but as a shared space for the future.
“The essence of my speech was to call for the countries of Northern Europe, the West, and the USA to conduct affairs in this region in a way that the climate here would be shaped by the warm Gulf Stream of a pan-European process, rather than the polar breath of accumulated suspicions and prejudices,” Gorbachev later wrote in his memoirs.
“From the international politics perspective, this marked the articulation of a new—Arctic—vector in the USSR’s foreign policy during Perestroika. The domestic Russian dimension was less obvious but no less significant. The Murmansk region, as the area geographically closest to the center, exemplified a range of crisis and pre-crisis factors: environmental degradation, depopulation, an excess of military infrastructure, and the absence of a clear and positive policy toward Indigenous small-numbered peoples,” says independent researcher and historian Ilya Solomeshch, exclusively for Arktida.
The Logic of Cooperation: How the Arctic Council Emerged and What Makes It Unique
Gorbachev’s speech transformed the region, sparking the so-called Rovaniemi Process—an initiative to create a new framework for cooperation focused on environmental security and sustainable development. In 1991, in Rovaniemi, Finland, eight Arctic states—the USSR, USA, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland—signed the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy.
The strategy centered on addressing pollution threats that could severely harm the region, from oil spills to radioactive contamination. Special emphasis was placed upon scientific cooperation to gather data on pollution sources, their scale and impact on the Arctic ecosystems.
Additionally, four working groups were established: for monitoring and assessing the state of the environment, protecting the Arctic marine environment, preventing and responding to emergencies, and conserving Arctic flora and fauna. These groups later became key components of the Arctic Council’s structure.
The establishment of the Council itself was preceded by the development of regional cooperation in Northern Europe.
“The historical paradox lies in the fact that, at the height of inter-bloc tensions, the Barents/Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) was established in January 1993. Among other things, BEAR cooperation initially helped mitigate the severity of the economic crisis in the Russian part of the region and address the most pressing environmental issues. It also created a platform for direct engagement in science, education, culture, and civil society,” Ilya Solomeshch explains.
In 1996, in Ottawa, eight nations—Russia, the USA, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland—signed a declaration founding the Arctic Council. Conceived as a forum, the Council aimed to focus on sustainable development, environmental protection, and the well-being of the Arctic Indigenous peoples. It deliberately excluded matters of international relations, domestic policies of member states, and regional economic development. The Council’s work was structured around permanent working groups.
The unique feature of the Arctic Council is the full inclusion of Arctic Indigenous peoples’ representatives as permanent participants.
Six organizations— the Inuit Circumpolar Council, Saami Council, Aleut International Association, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), Arctic Athabaskan Council, and Gwich’in Council International—gained the right to participate in all Council discussions on equal footing with states.
The Council became a vital mechanism for coordinating sustainable development in the Arctic. Crucially, it avoided political conflicts for many years, guided by a logic of cooperation rather than competition, enabling Arctic states to focus on collaborative efforts.
“The Arctic is a shared ecosystem. Ignoring this interconnectedness will not yield results. Joint work is an important step toward the region’s sustainable development. I have worked in this field for over a decade and see tremendous potential. The Arctic Council unites democratic countries with much to offer. They strive for cooperation, environmental protection, and the defense of Indigenous peoples’ rights,” says Pavel Sulyandziga,
Crisis of Trust: How the Invasion of Ukraine Impacted the Arctic Council
In November 2024, Rovaniemi, Finland—the city where the process that led to the creation of a platform for Arctic sustainable development began—once again found itself in the spotlight. It hosted NATO’s first large-scale exercises on Finnish soil following the country’s accession to the alliance. On May 6 and 7, 2024, Rovaniemi also saw a meeting of defense ministers from the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), where discussions focused on strengthening Northern European defense.
Meanwhile, in March 2025, Murmansk—the city where Gorbachev delivered his landmark speech at the end of the Cold War—hosted an Arctic forum. Notably, it saw minimal participation from Arctic states and was positioned by Russian Presidential Envoy Yuri Trutnev as an alternative to the Arctic Council. At the Murmansk forum, Vladimir Putin announced an increase in Russian military presence in the Arctic, reinforcing the trend toward regional militarization.
This followed a crisis triggered by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. At the time, Russia held the Arctic Council chairmanship under the slogan “Responsible Governance for a Sustainable Arctic.” Key priorities included regional economic development, environmental protection and climate resilience, support for Indigenous peoples, infrastructure and Northern Sea Route development, scientific cooperation, and emergency response measures. Over 100 events were planned, but most could not be implemented due to Russia’s international isolation.
In the summer of 2022, Western members of the Arctic Council decided to resume joint work on select projects, excluding Russia. This enabled minimal cooperation in areas like environmental monitoring, sustainable development, and safety. However, the Council’s future remained uncertain.
Russia has consistently criticized Western actions. In 2022, former Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov stated that decisions made by the Arctic Council without Moscow’s involvement would be illegitimate and violate the consensus principle enshrined in the organization’s guiding documents.
In 2023, Russia concluded its Arctic Council chairmanship with a brief statement issued on behalf of the Council. The transfer of chairmanship took place online in Salekhard, without foreign ministers or the customary Ssenior Arctic officials’ report and working group outcomes. The Council’s regularly updated archives show no ministerial-level meetings since December 2021.
During Norway’s chairmanship, Russia suspended contributions to the Council’s administrative budget—about 8% of the Secretariat’s funding. A 2022 report noted Russia’s inability to pay due to international sanctions. Notably, as of late 2020, Russia was the largest donor, contributing €10 million to the Project Support Instrument—twice the combined contributions of other countries.
Norway focused its chairmanship on four priorities: oceans, climate and environment, sustainable economic development, and support for Northern communities. Key activities included programs on wildfires and an Arctic youth conference.
Special attention was given to partially restoring the Arctic Council’s operations.
“I believe the main achievement of our chairmanship is bringing the Arctic Council back to business,” Morten Høglund cautiously noted in an interview concluding Norway’s chairmanship.
On Norway’s initiative, all six Council working groups held meetings via videoconference, with participation from representatives of relevant Russian organizations, marking a tentative first step toward resuming cooperation.
Between Agendas: How Russia and Other Member States Envision Sustainable Arctic Development
While there appears to be continuity in chairmanship agendas, semantic similarity analysis reveals significant differences in wording and priorities. For instance, the similarity between Russia’s (2021–2023) and Iceland’s (2019–2021) programs is lower at 0.15, compared to an average of 0.22. Meanwhile, Iceland and Norway (2023–2025) align closely with the average. Norway’s program also shows low similarity to Russia’s.
How the Analysis Was Conducted?
The analysis was based on 14 program documents from countries chairing the Arctic Council. After text preprocessing, the most significant two-word phrases were identified using TF-IDF (a measure to detect the most relevant and specific phrases for each text). These phrases were then converted into numerical vectors, and cosine similarity was calculated pairwise to assess the similarity between documents.
Examination of priority formulations reveals a key difference in perspective: Russia framed its agenda through state-led management of sustainable Arctic development, a paternalistic emphasis absent in both Norway’s and Iceland’s programs.
Russia’s agenda was notably broader, covering topics like tourism and infrastructure projects not addressed by others, while completely omitting issues like gender inequality and equity.
Regarding Indigenous rights, Russia proposed a detailed agenda, contrasting with Iceland’s near absence of such focus. However, Russia’s paternalistic approach still sidelined Indigenous rights and governance participation, prioritizing social policy and cultural heritage preservation.
In contrast, Norway, succeeding Russia, explicitly stated that sustainable Arctic development is impossible if economic activities negatively impact Indigenous communities’ lives and environments
Denmark’s program (explicitly encompassing the Kingdom, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands) heavily centers on Indigenous peoples’ issues.
Across all stated priorities—oceans, sustainable economic development, and climate change—Indigenous populations are not just mentioned but highlighted as a key focus of activity. However, the program’s continuity with previous agendas is relatively high at 0.43, while its similarity to Russia’s program is notably low at just 0.06.
Future of the Arctic Council: Scenarios of Evolution or Dissolution
The Arctic Council’s future remains uncertain. A 2022–2023 expert survey indicates pessimism within the Arctic community about resuming the Council’s work to full extent, though not all dismiss the concept of “Arctic exceptionalism” as a basis for cooperation.
Russia’s stance remains contradictory. On the one hand, Moscow affirms its commitment to the Council. Vladislav Maslennikov, Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s European Affairs Department, emphasized Russia’s intent to remain involved, guided by national interests.
On the other hand, in February 2025, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia could develop the Arctic independently, without full Council participation, asserting that “no one can expel us” and partners “will have to return to cooperation.”
According to 2025 Arctida research, nearly a third of respondents support Russia’s cooperation with other Arctic states, a 6% increase from 2023.
“Many Western Arctic institutions do not engage with the Russian Academy of Sciences or other institutes, and full-scale partnership is out of the question. However the West remains interested in Arctic cooperation, but in the current context, it’s simply impossible,” comments Pavel Sulyandziga.
All of this unfolds amid political discussions about Greenland’s future which strain the relations between the other two Arctic Council member states, namely the USA and Denmark, and following the invitation of the US in early 2025 to join projects in the Russian Arctic.
The Arctic Council continues to act without ministerial-level engagement—working groups meet virtually, including Russian representatives. However, as a platform for public coordination among Arctic states, the Council has lost its visibility. Bilateral relations, such as between the USA and Russia, are gaining prominence instead
A 2015 sociological study revealed that awareness of the Arctic Council’s activities is lowest in Russia and the USA, with only 32% of US respondents and 54% of Russian respondents aware of its work in general or in detail.
“Promoting Indigenous peoples’ rights has been a core task of the Council. But full cooperation is now impossible. Russia continues to saber-rattle, and RAIPON has been co-opted by the state—Russian Indigenous peoples are no longer represented in international processes as they once were,” Pavel Sulyandziga continues.
No Arctic country has yet proposed revising the Council’s status which indicates that the consensus around regional cooperation still does exist.
Experts believe the Council’s future will rely not only on the international relations among the Arctic states but also on bilateral ties between member countries and other actors like China and India. Several scenarios are possible.
According to one of them, the Arctic Council will lose its current political status, becoming a platform for “quiet” communication on issues like Arctic environmental protection. This conservative scenario is already unfolding—since 2022, most Council activities have been low-profile, focusing on pragmatic issues without addressing political disputes. Russian experts advocate for this conservative scenario, which could radically undermine Arctic cooperation as such.
Alongside the current dynamics, alternative institutionalized alliances could emerge, such as an A7 (Western Arctic Council countries). These could take on not only public promotion of the Arctic agenda but also security issues.
Another scenario involves reformatting the Arctic Council to reflect the political realities, likely leading to a revision of the Ottawa Declaration to include security and industrial activities in it.
Notably, Trump’s return to the White House diminishes the political weight of the climate agenda. According to the 2015 survey, over half of respondents in most Arctic countries, including 79% in Russia, believed it necessary to include military security in the Council’s agenda. Given ongoing militarization, this percentage likely persists or might have even grown.
The third scenario envisions differentiated cooperation, emphasizing regional interactions and the role of transboundary groups, including Arctic Indigenous peoples. However, this faces challenges due to domestic political structures, particularly in Russia.
“The vulnerability of sustainable regional cooperation involving Russia was evident as early as in the 2000s, long before the Ukrainian war. The ‘power vertical’ and ‘sovereign democracy’ practices critically limited decision-making by federal subjects, let alone municipalities, creating irreconcilable contradictions between regional transboundary cooperation principles and Russia’s actual governance practices,” Ilya Solomeshch concludes.
Finally, the fourth scenario foresees the collapse of consensus-based cooperation within the Arctic Council. As Ilya Solomeshch notes, “The withdrawal (or exclusion) of even one major player from this format could critically undermine not only the Council’s effectiveness but its very viability.” This would cement political realism in the region and a return to polarization.
