After February 24: How has the Russian Arctic changed over the last three years?

During the U.S.-Russia negotiations in Riyadh, the head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), Kirill Dmitriev, expressed readiness for cooperation between the two countries in the Arctic and even invited American oil companies to "return" to working with oil in Russia’s Arctic regions. Experts speculate about the nature of a possible deal, suggesting that the invitation to participate in Arctic development could be a way to start a conversation about lifting sanctions on Russia. But what is happening in the territories that Dmitriev proposed to "develop"?

Arctida explores how three years of war have affected Russia's Arctic regions.

In response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union, the U.S., the U.K., and other countries imposed sanctions that affected economic activities of Russian organizations in the Arctic. This led to the suspension, rescheduling, reduction, or even complete freezing of multibillion-dollar projects. Even the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) – which Russian officials have emphasized as strategically important for years – has come under threat.

Vladimir Putin has promoted the Northern Sea Route as an alternative to the Suez Canal. According to a sociological survey conducted by Arctida and Russian Field at the end of 2023, 85% of respondents support the development of the NSR. Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko has also repeatedly expressed a strong interest in the project.

Plans for the development of the route previously envisioned a significant increase in cargo traffic: up to 80 million tons by 2024, 150 million by 2030, and 200 million by 2035. Over the past three years, Russian officials have consistently promised to boost the Northern Sea Route's capacity. While cargo traffic is indeed growing – rising by nearly 5% in 2024 – the pace of growth falls significantly short of the original targets.

Altogether, even representatives of state corporations recognize the unrealistic nature of these plans. Commenting on cargo traffic figures in early January 2025, Alexey Likhachev, head of Rosatom (the operator of the Northern Sea Route), acknowledged:

By "realities," Likhachev was clearly referring to sanctions, which have affected major oil and gas projects in the Arctic – particularly Vostok Oil and the Arctic LNG-2. These projects were expected to provide a significant share of cargo for the strategically important Northern Sea Route.

The Arctic LNG-2 project, a $25 billion initiative by Novatek, has faced heavy pressure from sanctions. As early as May 2022, it lost access to already-built but yet to be delivered Korean natural gas tankers designed for Arctic conditions. Subsequently, it also lost access to key equipment for the construction of the LNG’s second and third production lines, leaving the future of their development highly uncertain.

The project, linked to Vladimir Putin's long-time associates Gennady Timchenko and Leonid Mikhelson, has not been helped by the fact that since the start of the war, the Arctic LNG-2 has received components worth 193 million euros through the mediation of Italian companies, bypassing sanctions.

Meanwhile, Rosneft’s Vostok Oil project, which was supposed to produce 30 million tons of oil in 2024, has yet to begin operations. Its launch has now been postponed to 2026. In 2025, Vostok Oil was hit with U.S. sanctions, further exacerbating problems with its access to equipment and appeal to investors.

According to Arctida’s analysis of official statistics, the average annual decline in oil production in Russia’s Arctic zone from 2022 to 2024 was 2.8%. As for natural gas, production remains high but is gradually decreasing – in 2017, the Arctic accounted for 90.4% of Russia’s total gas output, whereas today that share has dropped to 85.8%. Coal production saw a significant decline in 2023, but this was partially offset by growth in 2024 – coal extraction levels have now returned to 2018 figures (excluding the downturns in 2021 and 2023).

Overall, after a steep drop in oil, gas, and coal production in 2023, 2024 has shown signs of recovery, likely due to industry adaptation to sanctions and restrictions.

Sanctions have also impacted Russia’s renewable energy sector. Major investors in Russian projects (such as Italy’s Enel and Finland’s Fortum) as well as key suppliers of wind and solar equipment (like Denmark’s Vestas and the Netherlands’ Lagerwey) have all exited the market. As a result, the industry had to rebuild supply chains and find alternative partners, leading to a 25–35% increase in project costs and delays of 7 to 24 months.

Despite these challenges, the majority of projects survived, though some changed ownership. In certain cases, this led to legal disputes, while in others, Russian companies acquired assets that helped boost their image in the global climate agenda. For example, the largest wind farm beyond the Arctic Circle, Kola WPP, is now owned by Lukoil – the Russian company has since received environmental awards for it.

Overall, Russia’s renewable energy sector was able to adapt to sanctions by strengthening ties with “friendly countries”. By 2025, the sector is doing well from an economic perspective, and the 2024 annual report from the Association for the Development of Renewable Energy is filled with optimism.

No, in the context of the climate crisis, the situation with renewable energy in Russia is quite bleak. According to estimates from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), by 2050, the share of green energy worldwide should reach 77%, otherwise, we risk failing to keep global warming within 1.5°C. Any delay in the development of renewable energy – even in a single country – impacts the climate goals of humanity as a whole. Russia already has a regulatory framework and interested players, such as Rosatom with its renewable energy division, but in practice, the growth of renewables remains too slow, and the split with the West won't help speed it up. The current Russian government's plan is to

increase the share of solar and wind power plants in electricity production to 3.3% by 2042, which is far from the recommendations of scientists.

It’s worth noting that regional initiatives may play a crucial role in Russia’s transition to sustainable energy. For example, several Arctic regions have successfully implemented different practices: the Krasnoyarsk region is developing electric transport, the Murmansk region has proven that wind farms can be effective even beyond the Arctic Circle, and Komi is building energy-efficient buildings.

The Arctic has become the epicenter of climate change in recent years. At the same time, the war in Ukraine has led to the suspension of Russia's participation in international organizations aimed at combating the climate crisis. Consequently, the Arctic Council, which was used to coordinate science and politics, and facilitate data exchange among Arctic states, faced obstacles in its work.

In January 2025, Russia expressed its readiness to return to cooperation within this framework. How exactly this will happen remains unclear. On February 19 of this year, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia's position in the Council is very strong and that the country simply needs to "do its work," and the other council members will have no choice but to resume cooperation.

However, the Arctic Council is not the only platform for international cooperation. The scientific community is concerned about significant gaps in the study of global climate change, particularly the thawing of permafrost, due to Russia's partial exclusion from scientific cooperation as a result of sanctions. According to a study, the exclusion of 17 Russian monitoring stations from the international INTERACT network (the International Network for Terrestrial Research and Monitoring in the Arctic, which has only 60 stations total, including the Russian ones) leads to significant distortion of data on the climate crisis in the Arctic.

Given that nearly half of the Arctic and about 60% of the world's permafrost zone is within Russia, the lack of information exchange creates "white spots" in understanding the true scale of global warming. Furthermore, Western countries have suspended funding for joint research, accusing Russia of "withholding" some climate data.

The number of threats has increased. Due to sanctions on the oil extraction industry, Russia has created a "shadow fleet" consisting of quite old vessels, many of which are over 20 years old. The exact number of "shadow" ships servicing Russia’s Arctic projects is unknown, but as of January 10, 2025, 183 vessels were hit by U.S. sanctions. 11 tankers on the list exclusively transported Arctic oil from fields to export terminals in Russia.

The "shadow fleet" has already caused at least one environmental catastrophe: according to data from media, the oil spill in the Kerch Strait is linked to sanctions evasion.

Immediately after the start of the full-scale invasion, Russian authorities intensified pressure on public environmental organizations. As a result, it will be harder to push for systemic changes in legislation that could prevent ecological catastrophes in the Arctic, and in the case of a new disaster, it will be easier to cover it up.

At times, Russian authorities not only turn a blind eye to environmental violations, but also assist extraction companies. For example, Tigers Realm Coal, which had been extracting coal in Chukotka for years through open-pit mining, polluting the tundra, was linked to Russian officials.

From 2022 to 2024, new environmental NGOs and media outlets were added to the list of “foreign agents”: in 2024, activist Evgenia Chirikova and the publication Smola; in 2023, WWF and Kedr.media; in 2022, Tuba Kalik, Friends of the Baltic, Environmental Movement "42", Environmental Watch on Sakhalin, and the Center for the Preservation and Study of Salmon Species. Altogether since 2014, at least 43 environmental organizations and activists have been declared "foreign agents," seven of which operated in Arctic regions.

Today, some independent voices remain, but they either have limited ability to influence change within the country while in exile – and even working domestically, experts and organizations have to comply with a slew of repressive laws. All of this weakens the opportunities for independent public oversight of the environmental situation in the Arctic and the promotion of positive changes.

Notably, the pressure is not only on environmental organizations but also on indigenous peoples' associations.

In recent years, institutions that are supposed to represent the interests of the indigenous population of the Arctic have shifted into the orbit of the federal government. Many organizations that once advocated on behalf of historically marginalized peoples are now effectively controlled by the government. In some cases, independent associations are being liquidated and replaced by state structures. For example, in Chukotka, a grassroots association of whalers was replaced by an alliance led by a local official. Instead of protecting the interests of sea hunters, this alliance helps the FSB patrol the border and supports families of participants in the war in Ukraine.

Moreover, not only the state but also large corporations are trying to use indigenous peoples' organizations to advance their own interests. For instance, the Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East, better known as RAIPON, received 78 million rubles in donations from major extraction companies in 2022-2024.

All this makes it possible to use the “official” representatives of Indigenous peoples to promote political and economic interests. As a result, even on international platforms, positions are presented as if they were agreed upon by the entire community, when in reality they are dictated by the authorities and extractive companies, while real consensus within these communities may not exist.

Moreover, Russian authorities repress independent anti-war organizations of Indigenous peoples.

In July 2024, the Ministry of Justice designated 55 organizations as extremist. The list included decolonial movements representing Russia’s Indigenous peoples on international platforms, such as the International Committee of Indigenous Peoples of Russia, Aborigine Forum, and Russia of Indigenous Peoples.

At the same time, the trend of suppressing civil society in the Russian Arctic may intensify in the near future. The appointment of Nikolai Patrushev, former FSB director and a close ally of Vladimir Putin, as head of the Maritime Board – which includes the Council for the Protection of National Interests in the Arctic – indicates a desire to accelerate the securitization and militarization of the entire region.

На фоне усиления фракции «силовиков» общественное мнение относительно будущего российской Арктики разделилось — только половина поддерживает размещение войск и военных баз в российской Арктике. Как показывает опрос «Арктиды» и Russian Field в 2024 году, процент поддержки снижается: более молодые гораздо в меньшей степени хотят видеть в Арктике военные объекты.

According to journalists, men from national republics die in the war in Ukraine more frequently than others. Additionally, during mobilization, Indigenous peoples were drafted into the army more often than other ethnic groups. This has also been raised on international platforms. In a report presented to the UN Human Rights Council, Marianna Katzarova highlighted the forced and disproportionate nature of mobilization. Indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North (KMNS) have appealed to the authorities, demanding an end to the mobilization of Indigenous people, but their voices have yet to be heard.

A decline in the population of the Russian Arctic has been recorded since 2020. According to Rosstat, in 2022, the natural population growth rate was –1 per thousand (compared to –4 nationwide), and in 2023, it dropped to –1.6 (compared to –3.5 across Russia). Notably, the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Region have managed to maintain relatively stable demographic indicators, while the most severe situation is observed in Karelia.

Another important indicator is the migration growth rate. Here, the trend appears more positive. In 2022, migration growth stood at –4.5, but by 2023, there was a sharp shift in balance to +0.5. In 2022, the only region in the Russian Arctic where arrivals outnumbered departures was the Sakha Republic. However, by 2023, several regions experienced positive migration growth, including the Krasnoyarsk region, the Nenets Autonomous Region, the Murmansk region, and the Chukotka Autonomous Region. The Republic of Komi remains among the regions facing the most severe challenges, though the situation there is gradually improving.

The three years since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine have inevitably impacted mortality rates in the Russian Arctic. Rosstat data indicate a decline in the overall mortality rate; however, these figures do not include deaths from external causes – one of the key indicators for assessing the war's demographic impact. In 2023, To Be Precise presented an analysis of mortality in Russian regions based on Rosstat's 2022 data on external causes. The study based on 2023 data confirmed an increase in deaths from external causes across all Russian Arctic regions, with the sharpest rise observed in the Nenets Autonomous Region and Arkhangelsk region.

Previously, the Arctic was a space for international cooperation and dialogue, involving environmental organizations and independent representatives of Indigenous communities. However, the full-scale invasion has drastically altered this landscape. Today it has become all the more clear that despite the adaptation of extractive industries, the expansion of the "shadow fleet," and various achievements in Arctic development, climate, social, and demographic risks remain high. Moreover, the Arctic is increasingly becoming a domain of absolute control by macro-stakeholders – governments, corporations, and military structures – who are likely less responsive to inclusive dialogue. Can these stakeholders make well-founded decisions and preserve the Arctic without turning it into a closed military and economic zone, all while excluding civil society?