Investigation

Toxic Legacy

Published 17.09.2025

Burning all the coal assets of the late oligarch would cause as much pollution as an entire country emits in a year.

As part of the inheritance battle, billionaire Dmitry Bosov’s widow was labeled a “foreign agent.” If all of the late oligarch’s coal assets were burned, the resulting emissions would rival those of an entire country for a whole year. But do his heirs — or the Russian authorities — care?

In the spring of 2020, Dmitry Bosov’s name made headlines in two very different contexts. First, he appeared on the Forbes list of dollar billionaires for the first time, ranked 86th with an estimated net worth of $1.1 billion. Just a few weeks later, on May 6, news broke of his sudden death. From that moment, the story of his coal empire unraveled into a tangle of business deals, lawsuits, and corporate infighting.

Bosov entered the Forbes list with a billion-dollar fortune — and exited it holding a Glock 19 pistol, which he reportedly used to take his own life.

The circumstances struck many as suspicious. There had been no obvious personal or business troubles. In fact, the opposite seemed true: his wealth and influence were only growing.

During his lifetime, Bosov was well-connected to those in power — in some cases, quite literally. He lived in a sprawling mansion in Rublyovka, right next to the DAR Foundation estate and the gated community for senior FSO (Federal Protective Service) officials. According to Novaya Gazeta, the private jet Bosov used for personal travel was also used by a man with the exact same name as Mikhail Mishustin — back when Mishustin was still head of the Federal Tax Service. Meanwhile, the daughter of then-Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu founded a company called Arctic Logistic, which was later folded into Bosov’s holding. Interestingly, the phone number listed for Arctic Logistic was the same as the one used by Bosov’s VostokCoal — and by the Arctic and Northern Sea Route Development Working Group under the Russian Government’s Expert Council.

Businessman Dmitry Bosov against a blue background at a public event
Dmitry Bosov
Source:Alexander Ryumin / TASS

In other words, the government’s interest in Arctic resources — and in Dmitry Bosov’s business — began nearly a decade ago. And naturally, after his highly convenient suicide, they weren’t about to hand those assets over to just anyone.

Bosov’s widow, Katerina Bosov, was even declared a “foreign agent” — a move that conveniently removed her from the list of contenders for what was not only a lucrative inheritance, but one of strategic importance as well.

After Bosov’s death, the battle for his assets quickly spread across several regions.

In the Arctic, on the Taymyr Peninsula, disputes erupted over coal licenses and projects held by the Arctic Mining Company. In the Russian Far East — particularly in Primorye and the Amur region — the future of the Vera Port and the Ogodzhinskoye coal deposit hung in the balance. Meanwhile, in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the fate of the Pechora LNG project came into question. The division of Bosov’s empire covered the full map of his business interests — from the Kara Sea to the Pacific coast.

New Owners

The Arctic Mining Company (AGK) was the first focal point for competing interests. It held licenses for coal exploration and mining in Taymyr and was one of the core assets of VostokCoal, Bosov’s holding. What made it so attractive was the combination of Arctic development licenses and access to coastal infrastructure: AGK had leased land in Dikson to build the Chaika coal terminal, where a dock was planned to handle freight and enable export logistics.

After Bosov’s death, negotiations to sell the company began. In 2021, businessman Roman Trotsenko publicly mentioned a deal price of about $100 million for a 50% stake in AGK. But closing the deal hinged on resolving a long-standing conflict with co-owner Alexander Isaev. That triggered a flurry of lawsuits: Cyprus-based Isova Investments (one of Bosov’s entities used to manage his corporate holdings) and the company itself filed claims against Isaev and former CEO Vadim Bugayev. The total value of the suit — 600.5 million rubles — matched a previously imposed fine from Rosprirodnadzor (the federal environmental watchdog).

By that time, the company already had a track record of regulatory issues. In 2017, Rosprirodnadzor found violations at the Malolemberovskoye coal deposit: waste rock had been dumped directly on the soil, and there were documented oil spills. The fine was 274.5 million rubles. In 2019, another penalty followed — this time for violating the terms of its mining license.

Despite the growing list of infractions, by March 2021 the shareholders had settled their disputes, lawsuits were dropped, and by May, the deal with Trotsenko was finalized. AGK was now under the umbrella of his company “Northern Star,” which is developing the Syradasayskoye coal deposit — just 110 kilometers from the town of Dikson. “Northern Star” is part of the “Russian Energy” group, a conglomerate of projects owned by billionaire Roman Trotsenko.

Russian businessman Roman Trotsenko at a business event speaking in front of a microphone
Roman Trotsenko
Source:Alexander Kazakov / Kommersant

But the company didn’t escape the attention of regulators. The West Siberian Transport Prosecutor’s Office is challenging the lease of land near Cape Chaika, where AGK is building a coal terminal. According to the prosecutor’s office, the leased area overlaps with federally owned land along the Kara Sea coastline. Following a land auction, the parcel was transferred to the Dikson town administration — but now the administration itself is also being sued. Local officials, on the other hand, claim the lease was granted legally and specifically for port development needs.

Along with AGK, Trotsenko’s structures also acquired other coal assets in Taymyr — including the Polar Mining Company and VostokCoal Dikson.

Another major block of Bosov’s assets included the Vera Port in Primorye and the Ogodzhinsky coal project in the Amur region. In the summer of 2020, the heirs sold their 50% stakes in each asset for a combined 10 billion rubles to entities that already owned the other half. The buyers — Port Vera Holding and Ogodzha — include shareholders from Rostec. The consolidation of ownership paved the way for a new development strategy. One of Bosov’s sons confirmed that the transaction was approved by all heirs.

But the deal was preceded by serious conflict. In August 2020, Rostec and its partners demanded that VostokCoal honor call options and transfer additional shares to them at face value — just 3,340 rubles. Their rationale? A change of control: Bosov’s death and the departure of co-owner Alexander Isaev, who had held 50% of VostokCoal. Similar claims were made regarding the Ogodzha project. VostokCoal fought back in court, but by late 2020 the parties were negotiating a settlement. Eventually, all claims were dropped, lawsuits withdrawn, and the transactions finalized.

Later, both assets ended up in the hands of businessman Albert Avdolyan. His company, A-Property, had already announced plans back in 2019 to create an industrial cluster in the Russian Far East — bringing together YATEK, the Elginskoye coal mine, Vera Port, and the Ogodzha project.

The exact structure of this cluster was never publicly clarified, but ultimately, both the port and the coal project were transferred to Avdolyan’s control.

With the new owner came renewed attention to old problems. Residents of Primorye had long complained about conditions at Vera Port: prosecutors documented coal dust pollution, a lack of protective barriers, and open storage facilities. The dust blanketed the shoreline and seeped into the sea. Inspections led to fines in the hundreds of thousands of rubles — a drop in the bucket compared to the scale of the issue. In the Amur region, construction of a road from the Ogodzha deposit to the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) sparked outrage from environmentalists: the route cut through the Gerbikansky nature reserve, home to endangered species. In 2018, the reserve's status was downgraded “in the interest” of Bosov’s coal company. Environmental groups and local activists claimed that Bosov’s contractors had carried out work without a completed environmental review — and even in defiance of court orders. Regardless, by May 2025, the first section of the road was completed.

Port Vera coal terminal — coal transshipment port with berth, ships, conveyor system, open stockpiles and rail access on the coast; aerial shot.
Vera Coal Port Terminal
Source:Yuri Smityuk / TASS

Another one of Bosov’s assets — the Pechora LNG project in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug — was acquired after his death by former State Duma deputy Vitaly Yuzhilin and partners. The deal was reportedly valued at around $100 million. By then, Rosneft had already pulled out, considering the project unviable. The new owners announced bold plans: by 2025, they aimed to build a methanol plant with a capacity of 1.7 million tons per year, extract 2 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually, and construct a pipeline to the Barents Sea. By 2027, they planned to double gas production and build a second processing line — with total investments projected at 200 billion rubles.

Reality, however, painted a different picture.

As of August 2025, none of those milestones had been achieved. No plant, no pipeline, and gas production hadn’t reached the promised volumes. The project remains in the planning and approval phase, still searching for investors. The launch of the first phase has now been pushed back to 2029.

Locals in the Nenets region have met the methanol plant plans near Kumzha with skepticism. On May 30, 2022, remote public hearings were held, and the official minutes reflect widespread concerns. The local advocacy group “For the Protection and Development of NAO” emphasized that building a Russkhim facility there would violate community demands for minimal environmental impact on the Pechora River ecosystem.

Outside the Arctic, Bosov’s heirs also divested other assets. In 2021, Albert Avdolyan’s entities acquired Sibanthracite, Russia’s largest anthracite producer. Two years later, the company was resold to the Bashkir Industrial Holding, later renamed SibCapital. According to public records, controlling stakes were previously held by Oleg Polyakov, former co-owner of the engineering firm Peton, and entrepreneur Vanik Vanunts. Today, the company’s founders are hidden in accordance with Russian corporate secrecy laws (Federal Law 129).

Dmitry Bosov’s death closed the chapter on his personal story — but opened an ongoing saga of corporate takeovers and legal battles. His assets were divided among a handful of major players. Some projects, like Northern Star, are expanding and under active development. Others, like Pechora LNG, are stuck in limbo. And environmental controversies continue to cast long shadows — from coal dust in Primorye to threats looming over the Pechora River.

A row of open-top railcars filled with black coal standing on railway tracks, top view.
Source:Alexander Miridonov / Kommersant

Why Bosov’s Coal Legacy Has Become a Problem

A significant portion of Dmitry Bosov’s empire was built on coal. In today’s world, such a legacy — now passed into new hands — can rightly be called toxic.

Coal is the most damaging fossil fuel when it comes to the climate. Burning it releases more carbon dioxide (CO₂) per unit of energy than any other fossil fuel — about 25% more than oil and nearly double that of natural gas. CO₂ emissions from coal combustion alone have been responsible for more than 0.3°C of the roughly 1°C rise in global average temperatures since the start of the industrial era.

This is why continuing to mine and burn coal is incompatible with the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C — the central aim of the Paris Agreement, which Russia is a signatory to.

Coal burning is also a major source of black carbon, which poses a unique threat to the Arctic. When these fine particles settle on snow and ice, they darken the surface, reducing its ability to reflect sunlight. This speeds up melting and intensifies warming.

According to a 2019 estimate from the International Energy Agency, developing new coal mines or expanding existing ones would guarantee failure to meet the Paris climate targets. To stay within the relatively “safe” 1.5°C threshold, around 90% of global coal reserves must remain unextracted.

Estimates from Arctida show that if all of the extractable reserves from Sibanthracite (685 million tons) were mined and burned, the resulting CO₂ emissions would total 1.8 billion tons — equivalent to 90% of Russia’s annual emissions.

Meanwhile, the coal reserves in the Sugodinsko-Ogodzhinskaya coal-bearing region could emit 102 million tons of CO₂ — roughly equal to the entire annual emissions of Russia’s agricultural sector.

In addition to its climate impact, coal combustion pollutes the air with toxic substances like mercury, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, lead, and other heavy metals. Health effects include asthma, respiratory illness, brain damage, cardiovascular disease, cancer, neurological disorders, and premature death. You don’t have to look far for examples: the “black sky” smog in Krasnoyarsk and the coal dust coating windowsills in Murmansk have severely impacted residents’ quality of life — with no solution in sight for years.

Coal combustion at thermal power plants also produces a waste byproduct — fly ash — which can contaminate nearby water sources. This ash contains fine particulate matter, including PM2.5, which poses a serious environmental and health hazard by penetrating deep into human lungs.

Industrial smokestacks emitting thick black smoke into the atmosphere at sunset; silhouettes of plant facilities in orange sky.
Source:Alexander Manzyuk / TASS

Other environmental impacts include acid mine drainage, the destruction of mountain streams and valleys from mountaintop removal mining, and potential water conflicts in affected regions.

At the 2021 UN Climate Conference in Glasgow, where Russia was also present, nations agreed to phase down coal use in an effort to save the climate. Although coal remains the world’s largest source of electricity, its share in global power generation is now at its lowest since 1974. In developed economies, coal use peaked in 2007, and even in China and India — the world’s top coal consumers — renewables are increasingly starting to push coal out.

The Powering Past Coal Alliance, a global coalition aimed at accelerating the transition away from coal, now includes 180 national and regional governments, companies, and organizations. Financial leaders have declared there is “no rationale” for funding new coal projects. Bloomberg has even launched a “coal countdown,” tracking the global shutdown of coal power plants. (Russia remains marked in red on the map — one of the few countries still building new coal-fired units.)

All of these trends point to the medium- and long-term economic futility of coal assets.

Five years after Dmitry Bosov’s death, his coal empire has completely fractured, split among different — and sometimes competing — owners and projects. Each carries the baggage of past disputes, and not just corporate ones — but environmental as well.

Some inheritances, it seems, are best left unclaimed.

Cover photo: Yevgeny Razumny / Kommersant

Prepared in collaboration with: