The world’s oceans are becoming a stage for a geopolitical “Battleship” game. Alongside Donald Trump’s signed Executive Order “On Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance,” the Russian Maritime Board, established last year, also shows clear signs of strengthening the role of the security and military elite bloc in the Arctic zone management.

In the investigation, analysts from Arctida and the editorial team of Novaya Gazeta examine the role of Nikolai Patrushev in the struggle for oceanic dominance and the ways the Arctic and the sea are transforming from economic development into national security zones.

In April, the Murmansk Arctic Forum hosted a public meeting of the State Council commission on Arctic development at which governors of the Arctic regions, Presidential Aide and Chairman of the Maritime Board Nikolai Patrushev, and General Director of the Russian Direct Investment Fund Kirill Dmitriev spoke.

Several conclusions can be drawn from their speeches. One pertains to the future: an emerging partnership between the Maritime Board and Murmansk Region Governor Andrei Chibis is taking shape, particularly regarding the Northern Sea Route as a potential national project. Another one relates to the past: the speakers seemed to draw on Soviet experience, with nearly all unanimously supporting the idea of how effective the Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput) once was.

The Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput) was an organization that functioned in 1932-1964 under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (later the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of the Merchant Fleet). It managed not only the Northern Sea Route (NSR) but also the broader economic development of the Arctic. Today, some of these functions have been assigned to the Maritime Board of the Russian Federation, established in 2024. This new entity effectively consolidates the roles of the former Maritime Board under the Government, which implemented Russia’s Maritime Doctrine and fleet management, and the Interagency Commission of the Security Council on safeguarding national interests in the Arctic. 

However, a critical question was notably absent from discussions at the Murmansk Arctic Forum: how, and in what direction, might Russia’s Arctic policy change with Nikolai Patrushev’s appointment as head of the Maritime Board? Does Patrushev’s transition from the Security Council to the Maritime Board represent, as initially assumed, an honorable retirement, or is it, conversely, a strengthening of both Patrushev’s influence and the Arctic’s significance, which, under the sway of security officials, is drifting toward the center of Russian geopolitics?

Analysts at Arctida have long been monitoring the activities of Nikolai Patrushev, head of the Maritime Board. They analyzed recent changes in the composition of the Board’s commissions and reviewed public statements from its press office. Their findings reveal that Patrushev’s aggressive self-promotion in his current role far surpasses that of his predecessors. He is the first Board chair to outshine President Vladimir Putin in the number of mentions on the agency’s news website.

Nikolai Patrushev has been a Presidential Aide since May 2024, previously serving as Secretary of the Security Council from 2008 to 2024 and Director of the FSB from 1999 to 2008. In May 2024, before the Maritime Board was established in August 2024, Patrushev was removed from his Security Council post and appointed Presidential Aide for Shipbuilding. Dmitry Peskov commented at the time, “This is, of course, a slightly different role. But it is an absolutely strategic sector, vast and highly complex. Therefore, Nikolai Platonovich’s vast experience will undoubtedly play a significant role.” Meanwhile, Patrushev’s younger son, Andrei, an FSB officer, served as Deputy Director of Gazprom Neft for shelf project development. In 2019, he founded the NGO “Arctic Initiatives Center,” and in December 2022, he became a co-owner of the Arkhangelsk Commercial Seaport, a key component of the Northern Sea Route. 

The websites of the Maritime Board and of its predecessor (the Maritime Board under the Government) share the same address, allowing for a continuous analysis of the press office statements. Since at least 2018, the Board’s website has regularly published press releases, the vast majority of which focused on President Putin’s activities, both related and unrelated to maritime and Arctic issues.

We take two key dates as milestones: 24 February, 2022, as it was after this event that the Maritime Board’s press office intensified its coverage of Vladimir Putin’s activities, publishing major news about him regardless of any connection to maritime issues; and August 13, 2024, the date of the Decree that restructured the Maritime Board into a new entity under Patrushev.

Starting from August 13, 2024 the press office messaging statistics shift as follows:

While previous leaders—Manturov and Borisov before him—were mentioned relatively rarely by the Maritime Board’s press office, with Manturov even referred to as “Minister of Industry and Trade,” Putin’s activities, even those unrelated to maritime issues, were actively covered. Now, Patrushev has overtaken Putin in media mentions, consistently titled “Presidential Aide, Chairman of the Maritime Board of the Russian Federation,” emphasizing his elevated status. This is no longer a technical role combined with another departmental portfolio, as it was before, but a standalone, exclusive supervisory and coordinating position.

The surge in the Board’s public activity and the spotlight on Patrushev are the result of intensified PR efforts, but that’s not it. Several factors converge here:

The shift signals a transformation in both the Maritime Board’s image and its institutional weight. It is no longer merely an interagency coordinating council but a kind of “super-agency” with ambitions far beyond sectoral issues. It is also no coincidence that after Patrushev’s departure from the Security Council, the Council itself appears to have lost much of its political clout, while Patrushev has gained a new platform for influence in the maritime (and Arctic) sphere. It’s worth noting that Patrushev is connected to the Arctic by family ties, his younger son, Andrei, being an active player in Arctic business.

It is no longer merely an interagency coordinating council but a kind of “super-agency” with ambitions far beyond sectoral issues. It is also no coincidence that after Patrushev’s departure from the Security Council, the Council itself appears to have lost much of its political clout, while Patrushev has gained a new platform for influence in the maritime (and Arctic) sphere. It’s worth noting that Patrushev is connected to the Arctic by family ties, his younger son, Andrei, being an active player in Arctic business.

The Maritime Board is tasked with implementing Russia’s maritime policy principles by coordinating the activities of various government bodies, as outlined in the Maritime Doctrine. Over the past 25 years, three versions of the doctrine have been adopted. While they may seem similar at first glance, a closer look at shifts in rhetoric and priorities reveals changes in Russia’s foreign policy.

The first editionversion, adopted in 2001, was meant to guide state policy in the World Ocean until 2020. However, in 2015, due to sanctions and the resurgence of Cold War-style tensions, the doctrine was revised. Notably, references to “Ukrainian territory” were removed from the 2015 version. The clause about “improving the legal framework for the Black Sea Fleet’s operations on Ukrainian territory and maintaining Sevastopol as its main base” was replaced with several points focusing on developing military-naval and transport infrastructure in Crimea.

Significant changes also affected the section dedicated to the Arctic. In the 2001 version, the emphasis was on “exploring and developing the Arctic with a focus on advancing export-oriented industries and prioritizing the resolution of social issues.” However, in 2015, the doctrine introduced references to “threats to national security.” Consequently, from that point onward, Russia’s activities in the Arctic zone are directed toward mitigating these threats.

The shift in emphasis from the rhetoric of economy and development to national security threats continued in 2022, when the Arctic was described as a "region of global competition not only from an economic but also a military perspective." This wording signals a radical change in priorities compared to the 2001 version.

While the 2001 and 2015 versions differ only slightly, in 2022, the Arctic is presented as an arena of global competition across various domains.

The 2015 Maritime Doctrine specifies that the Maritime Board is a “permanent coordinating body ensuring coordinated actions of federal and regional executive authorities and organizations in maritime activities, shipbuilding, marine technology development, and the exploration and development of the World Ocean, Arctic, and Antarctic research.”

In 2022, these wordings were largely retained. However, in August 2024, Putin re-established the Maritime Board, approved its statute, and amended the Maritime Doctrine. It is no longer the Maritime Board under the Government but simply the Maritime Board of the Russian Federation, operating independently. It is now tasked with “protecting Russia’s national interests and strengthening its defense capabilities in the World Ocean” (contrast this with the 2022 version, which technocratically focused on coordination and alignment of actions). Last but not least: the Government used to report on the implementation of the doctrine’s measures; now, this responsibility falls directly to Nikolai Patrushev as Chairman of the Maritime Board of the Russian Federation.

Based on affiliations and connections, “ArctidaArktida” categorizes Maritime Board members into the following “influence groups”: security forces and agencies, transportation and logistics, shipbuilding and navigation, ecology and environmental oversight, fisheries, economy and industry, science and education, energy and subsoil use, the defense-industrial complex and state defense orders, and others. Separate groups were identified based on their affiliation with government bodies, businesses, and state corporations.

A single individual may belong to multiple groups. For instance, Nikolai Patrushev’s eldest son, Dmitry, was included in Manturov’s Maritime Board as Minister of Agriculture. However, his Arctic-related activities and familial ties to Nikolai Patrushev also align him with the siloviki (security and military elite) bloc.

The table and charts indicate that the Maritime Board under Patrushev has seen a significant increase in the representation of siloviki (security and military elite) both in percentage and absolute terms: 28% of Patrushev’s Board has a security background, compared to just 8% under Manturov (16 individuals vs. 6). Additionally, the representation of regional authorities (governors of maritime and Arctic regions) slightly increased in Patrushev’s Board. However, some Arctic governors, such as Yakutia’s, were excluded, while governors of “new regions” and another Arctic region, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, were added.

The number of individuals with “Arctic” affiliations outside the Maritime Board decreased due to the exclusion of Rosatom subsidiaries: in 2024, the deputy head of Rosatom for the Northern Sea Route, the head of Atomflot, and the head of FGKU “Glavsevmorput” were not included. However, the direct inclusion of Rosatom’s CEO means that, qualitatively, its representation is even stronger than in the previous composition.

In September 2024, Nikolai Patrushev, following a presidential decree, established Councils within the Maritime Board and approved their compositions. Three Councils were created:

Compared to the previous composition, the new Board saw a rotation of governors. Four governors who served under Manturov were excluded. In 2025, three regional heads were added to the Maritime Board: the governors of Kamchatka, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and the so-called “governor of Zaporizhzhia Oblast.” However, they are not entrusted with security roles: no regional leaders, except former governor Alikhanov, are included in the Navy Council. Meanwhile, the heads of Arkhangelsk Oblast and Karelia are excluded from the Maritime Council and only participate in the Arctic Council.

This Council handles national maritime policy, excluding military aspects, focusing on shipbuilding, the fleet, and port infrastructure.

Of the 33 members, 10 are from regional authorities (current heads of maritime regions and former head A. Alikhanov), with 8 participating solely in this Council. Only Murmansk Oblast Governor Andrey Chibis is also in the Arctic Council, suggesting his growing influence and ties to the siloviki. Industry and Trade Minister Alikhanov (former Kaliningrad Governor) participates in all three Councils.

Apart from regional leaders, the Maritime Council includes the Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic Chekunkov. Additionally, 6 members are linked to transport and shipping, alongside figures connected to fisheries, ecology, the Emergencies Minister, the Science and Higher Education Minister, and heads of Rosnedra and Rosgidromet.

16 out of 33 members of the Maritime Board were previously part of Manturov’s collegium. That makes the council the closest to the Maritime Board in its former structure, before its reorganization and removal from direct governmental oversight (the council is related to regional issues, transportation, and shipping). This is confirmed by both its composition and the nature of topics discussed in press releases and documents.

The Council head Sergei Vakhrukov is another prominent figure in the Maritime Board. The former Yaroslavl Oblast Governor (2007–2012), he served as aide (2013) and deputy (since 2016) to Security Council Secretary Patrushev, underscoring Patrushev’s influence and his protégés’ prominence. Vakhrukov’s son, Dmitry, is Deputy Minister of Economic Development.

Chaired by Presidential Envoy to the Far East Yuri Trutnev, the Russian Arctic Council held its first meeting in November 2024. There Patrushev stated that the Council should succeed the Security Council’s interagency commission on Arctic national interests and focus on analyzing internal and external threats to national security, assessing the military-political situation in the Arctic, and evaluating socio-economic conditions and other maritime policy priorities. Previously, S. Vakhrukov and Yu. Trutnev were deputy chairs under D. Medvedev, who is not part of Patrushev’s Maritime Board.

Of the 30 members, 8 represent security structures, 7 are linked to the Arctic (via activities like NOVATEK’s operations, Northern Sea Route management, or regional ties), and 5 are connected to extractive industries, energy, and subsoil use (e.g., Rosneft, Rosnedra, and the Natural Resources Minister). The Council also includes representatives from ecology, transport, shipbuilding, industry, fisheries, and science.

Environmental and climate issues are not a priority for the Maritime Board, as is evident from the limited representation: only members from Rosnedra, Rosgidromet, FMBA, and the Natural Resources Minister are closely tied to these themes. Under Manturov, Rosprirodnadzor head Svetlana Radionova, infamous for her role in the 2020 Norilsk diesel spill, and former Yamal environmental prosecutor A.M. Kaliberda were included, but both are absent from the current Board.

Of non-governmental organizations, only the Seafarers’ Union has been included. Cultural representation has also been limited to just one museum (the Museum of the World Ocean). Most scientific organizations in the Board are dual-purpose entities.

The activities and composition of the Navy Council chaired by Nikolai Patrushev clearly show its military and security focus. Of its 21 members, 12 are linked to security or law enforcement structures, and 6 to the defense-industrial complex or state defense orders. Representation from economics, industry, transport, shipbuilding, and business exists, but the key roles are taken by siloviki.

According to its founding documents, the Council aims to develop “measures for the strategic advancement of the Navy,” coordinating federal and regional bodies and organizations. Its functions include drafting directives, evaluating armament programs, advancing shipbuilding, human resources, scientific potential, navigation, and security.

Notably, while there is an overlap between the Russian Arctic and Maritime Councils, few individuals serve in both the Maritime Council and the Patrushev-led Navy Council. Patrushev himself is not part of the Maritime Council. This separation underscores a divide between the Maritime Council, which continues Manturov’s Maritime Board legacy, and the security-focused bloc under Patrushev, primarily active in the Navy and Russian Arctic Councils.

Only six individuals are members of all three Councils:

The following four of them represent the security bloc and Presidential Administration:

These six, alongside Nikolai Patrushev and Yuri Trutnev, are likely to form the core of the Maritime Board post-2024. The majority, both in membership and leadership, are siloviki, reinforcing their dominance.

Following the March 2025 reform of the Maritime Board, a presidium led by Nikolai Patrushev was established, and seven new members were added: O.V. Kazanov (replacing E.I. Petrov as head of Rosnedra), three governors, and two siloviki, including Investigative Committee head A.I. Bastryskin. Patrushev personally approves the presidium’s composition, but this is unlikely to shift the balance of power significantly within the Board.

This leads us to the following conclusion on the key trends of Russia’s maritime and Arctic policies:

The last two trends are most evident in the establishment of two security councils within the Maritime Board: the Council for Strategic Development of the Navy and the Russian Arctic Council. The third council—focused on maritime activity development and support—includes governors of coastal and Arctic regions, transport-related organizations, and primarily civilian entities. This council is closest in composition and focus to the previous Maritime Board under Manturov and, earlier, Borisov.

Overall, changes in the Maritime Board’s structure and composition of 2024-2025 reflect Russia’s push for stronger control and coordination in maritime affairs, particularly in strategic regions like the Arctic, merging maritime and Arctic governance with a clear securitization trend.

The “Arctida” study highlights that the 2024 Maritime Board is a more security-oriented, centralized, and strategically focused structure, prioritizing defense, logistics control, and national security.